On the Explanatory Value of Inequity Aversion Theory

In a number of papers on their theory of Inequity Aversion, E. Fehr and K. Schmidt have claimed that the theory explains the behavior in many experiments. By virtue of having an infinite number of parameters the theory can predict a wide range of outcomes, from the competitive to the cooperative. Its prediction depends on values of these parameters. Fehr & Schmidt provide no explicit methodological plan for their project and as a result they repeatedly make logical and methodological errors. We look at the methodology of their explanations and find that no connection has been established between the experimental data and the behavior predicted by the theory. We conclude that the theory of inequity aversion has no explanatory value beyond its trivial capacity to predict a broad range of outcomes as a function of its parameters

Gregarious Behaviour of Evasive Prey

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004We model the formation of a herd as a game between a predator and a prey population. The predator receives some information about the composition of the herd when he chases it, but receives no information when he chases a solitary individual. We describe situations in which the herd and its leader are in conflict and in which the leader bows to the herd’s wish but where this is not to the benefit of the herd

Gregarious Behaviour of Evasive Prey

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004We model the formation of a herd as a game between a predator and a prey population. The predator receives some information about the composition of the herd when he chases it, but receives no information when he chases a solitary individual. We describe situations in which the herd and its leader are in conflict and in which the leader bows to the herd’s wish but where this is not to the benefit of the herd.

Gregarious Behaviour of Evasive Prey

Gregarious behavior of potential prey was explained by Hamilton (1971) on the basis of risk-sharing: The probability of being picked up by a predator is small when one makes part of a large aggregate of prey. This argument holds only if the predator chooses its victims at random. It is not the case for herds of evasive prey in the open, where prey’s gregarious behavior, favorable for the fast group members, makes it easier for the predator to home in on the slowest ones. We show conditions under which, gregarious behavior of the relatively fast prey individuals leaves slowest prey with no other choice but to join the group.Failing to do so would signal their vulnerability, making them a preferred target for the predator. Analysis of an n + 1 player game of a predator and n unequal prey individuals clarifies conditions for fully gregarious, partially gregarious, or solitary behavior of the prey.

Do People Exploit their Bargaining Power? : an Experimental Study

Do people “play fair,†or do they exploit their bargaining power? This paper suggests that such questions may not be well posed. It studies two bargaining situations that are very similar from the point of view of current fairness/focal theories of behavior, but differ in their strategic aspects. Different behavior in the two cases and a tendency by subjects after the experiment to describe as “fair†what actually occurred are reported.Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100629/1/ECON106.pd

Job competition, employability and incentives for human capital formation

This note describes the effects on human capital formation of rank-order tournaments offering identical prizes to a given share of the ranked contestants. This compensation scheme is thought to resemble the selection processes in different areas of the public administration, particularly in Southern European countries. In the presence of contestants with identical ability, the incentives for educational effort are highest when the variance of final returns is maximized

Effect of SARS-CoV-2 proteins on vascular permeability.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-CoV-2 infection leads to severe disease associated with cytokine storm, vascular dysfunction, coagulation, and progressive lung damage. It affects several vital organs, seemingly through a pathological effect on endothelial cells. The SARS-CoV-2 genome encodes 29 proteins, whose contribution to the disease manifestations, and especially endothelial complications, is unknown. We cloned and expressed 26 of these proteins in human cells and characterized the endothelial response to overexpression of each, individually. Whereas most proteins induced significant changes in endothelial permeability, nsp2, nsp5_c145a (catalytic dead mutant of nsp5), and nsp7 also reduced CD31, and increased von Willebrand factor expression and IL-6, suggesting endothelial dysfunction. Using propagation-based analysis of a protein–protein interaction (PPI) network, we predicted the endothelial proteins affected by the viral proteins that potentially mediate these effects. We further applied our PPI model to identify the role of each SARS-CoV-2 protein in other tissues affected by coronavirus disease (COVID-19). While vali-dating the PPI network model, we found that the tight junction (TJ) proteins cadherin-5, ZO-1, and β-catenin are affected by nsp2, nsp5_c145a, and nsp7 consistent with the model prediction. Overall, this work identifies the SARS-CoV-2 proteins that might be most detrimental in terms of endothelial dysfunction, thereby shedding light on vascular aspects of COVID-1